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REFLECTIONS ON STARE DECISIS IN MICHIGAN: 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE "REZONING 
AS ADMINISTRATIVE ACT" DOCTRINE 
Roger A. Cunningham* 
In an earlier article in this law review,1 I discussed the new doc-
trine that in certain municipalities a decision by the local governing 
body to rezone or not to rezone land should be deemed an "adminis-
trative" or "quasi-judicial," rather than a "legislative," act.2 This 
doctrine was introduced into Michigan law several years ago in a 
series of opinions signed by only three justices of the Michigan Su-
preme Court. 3 The earlier article dealt principally with the merits 
of the new "rezoning as administrative act" doctrine. The present 
article discusses troublesome aspects of the Michigan Supreme 
Court's attitude toward the principle of stare decisis, as reflected in 
the opinions previously discussed and several more recent opinions. 
The article also reports on the demise of the "rezoning as adminis-
trative act" doctrine in Michigan law. 
Stare decisis is, of course, one of the foundations of the Anglo-
American legal system, a principle designed to maintain the stability, 
predictability, and harmony of the law. The principle dictates that 
a rule of law that has become settled by a series of decisions of the 
highest court within a given jurisdiction is held to be binding even 
on that highest court, absent a substantial change in conditions that 
would justify the court's reconsideration and rejection or reformu-
lation of the rule. The Michigan Supreme Court decisions to be dis-
cussed here-mostly decisions in zoning cases-suggest that the 
proper scope and application of stare decisis is now an unsettled 
question in Michigan. 
In Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights,4 the plaintiffs had filed a 
petition with the local governing body seeking to have their property 
* Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. S.B. 1942, J.D. 1948, Harvard 
University.-Ed. 
1. Cunningham, Rezoning by Amendment as an Administrative or Quasi-Judicial 
Act: The "New Look" in Michigan Zoning, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (1975). 
2. This will hereafter be called the "rezoning as administrative act" doctrine. 
3. Nickola v. Grand Blanc Township, 394 Mich. 589, 232 N.W.2d 604 (1975); 
Smookler v. Wheatfield Township, 394 Mich. 574, 232 N.W.2d 616 (1975); Sabo 
v. Monroe Township, 394 Mich. 531, 232 N.W.2d 584 (1975). 
4. 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974). 
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rezoned from single-family zoning to a use classification that would 
permit multiple-family dwellings to be constructed on the site. 
"Failing in this endeavor, the plaintiffs then brought suit in the cir-
cuit court . . . [asserting] that . . . {the ordinance in question] was 
unreasonable, unconstitutional, and confiscatory as it applied to their 
property."5 The circuit court denied relief to the plaintiffs, but the 
court of appeals reversed and remanded. A four-member majority 
of the supreme court6 then reversed the court of appeals and held 
that the burden rested on the plaintiffs to prove that the exclusion 
of multiple-family dwellings was unreasonable, arbitrary, and confis-
catory;7 that the plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of proof ;8 
and that the evidence supported the trial judge's finding that "the 
instant property was suitable for, could be developed for, and was 
salable when used for single family residential purposes."0 
This holding was based on the traditional Michigan judicial ap-
proach to such zoning cases, under which the existing zoning regu-
lations are presumed to be valid and the landowner who has failed 
to obtain a rezoning is limited to a constitutional attack on the regu-
lations-. an attack that carries a heavy burden of proof. The pre-
sumption of validity and the allocation of the burden of establishing 
by clear and convincing evidence the unconstitutionality of the regu-
lations as applied to the land in question are, of course, premised 
on the traditional (and still almost universally accepted) rule that 
rezoning by amendment is a "legislative act" of the local governing 
body. It is clear that the principle of stare decisis dictated the ap-
proach adopted by the majority in Kropf.10 
5. 391 Mich. at 147-48, 215 N.W.2d at 181. 
6. Justices Levin and T.G. Kavanagh concurred in the result; Justice Fitzgerald 
did not participate. 
7. 391 Mich. at 156-57, 215 N.W.2d at 186. 
8. 391 Mich. at 159-63, 215 N.W.2d at 187-89, 
9. 391 Mich. at 163-64, 215 N.W.2d at 189. 
10. See, e.g., Biske v. City of Troy, 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W.2d 453 (1969); 
Bowman v. City of Southfield, 377 Mich. 237, 140 N.W.2d 504 (1966); Padover v. 
Township of Farmington, 374 Mich. 622, 132 N.W.2d 687 (1965); Roll v. City of 
Troy, 370 Mich. 94, 120 N.W.2d 804 (1963); Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 
367 Mich. 508, ·116 N.W.2d 816 (1962); Alderton v. City of Saginaw, 367 Mich. 
28, 116 N.W.2d 53 (1962); Tireman-Joy-Chicago Improvement Assn. v. Chernick, 
361 Mich. 211, 105 N.W.2d 57 (1960); Dequindre Dev. Co. v. Charter Township, 
359 Mich. 634, 103 N.W.2d 600 (1960); Lamb v. City of Monroe, 358 Mich. 136, 
99 N.W.2d 566 (1959); Uday v. Dearborn, 356 Mich. 542, 96 N.W.2d 775 (1959); 
Cook v. Bandeen, 356 Mich. 328, 96 N.W.2d 743 (1959); Roberts v. City of Three 
Rivers, 352 Mich. 463, 90 N.W.2d 696 (1958); Robinson v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 
350 Mich. 425, 86 N.W.2d 166 (1957) (commonly cited as Brae Burn, Inc. v. Bloom-
field Hills). 
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In Kropf, Justice Levin, supported by Justice T. G. Kavanagh, 
concurred in the result11 but advanced a new view of the nature of 
at least some rezoning amendments. In many localities, he stated, 
"there have been dozens, hundreds and, in some cases, thousands 
of zoning map changes, exceptions and variances granted";12 in such 
communities, the process of pa·ssing upon applications for rezoning 
amendments should be treated not as a "legislative act" but rather 
as an "administrative act." This being the case, Justice Levin 
argued, the criterion for granting or denying the requested rezoning 
should not be whether the existing zoning regulations meet the con-
stitutional test of "reasonableness," with the burden on the land-
owner to establish that they do not permit any reasonable use of his 
land. Instead, the test should be whether the proposed zoning clas-
sification is "reasonable in light of all the circumstances,"13 with the 
landowner having the burden of proof on this issue. Justice Levin 
concluded that the decision of the court of appeals therefore should 
be reversed "without prejudice to an application to the legislative 
body of the City of Sterling Heights seeking an administrative 
hearing with regard to the reasonableness of the proposed use."14 
He further concluded that, under the applicable court rule, 15 
[i]f the local authorities deny a change in zoning then a writ of super-
intending control could be sought; similarly, a nearby property owner 
might seek superintending relief against a change granted. If the 
property owner also claims that the presently permitted use is un-
reasonable, he may, to avoid a multiplicity of actions, assert that addi-
tional ground for relief.16 
Justice Levin's Kropf opinion, supported by only one other 
member of the court, might have been dismissed as unlikely to have 
any practical effect on the development of Michigan law. But in 
West v. City of Portage,17 even though the issue was -not the same 
as in Kropf, the views advanced by Justice Levin in Kropf on the 
"administrative" character of local decisions on rezoning obtained 
additional support. By a 4-3 decision, the court in West held .that 
an amendment to a city zoning ordinance which changes the zoning 
of a particular property is not subject to a referendary vote of the 
11. 391 Mich. at 164, 215 N.W.2d at 190 (Levin, J., concurring). 
12. 391 Mich. at 168, 215 N.W.2d at 192. 
13. 391 Mich. at 172, 215 N.W.2d at 194. 
14. 391 Mich. at 173, 215 N.W.2d at 194. 
15. MICH. GEN. Cr. R. 711. 
16. 391 Mich. at 173 n.8, 215 N.W.2d at 194 n.8. 
17. 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974). 
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electors of the city.18 Justice Levin's opinion for the court, holding 
that rezoning is an "administrative act," was signed by Justice Fitz-
gerald as well as by Justice T. G. Kavanagh. Although Justice Cole-
man originally signed the Levin opinion, she withdrew her signature 
prior to publication and merely concurred in the result. Justices 
Williams, Swainson, and T. M. Kavanagh dissented. 
Under traditional analysis, the West case did not establish as new 
Michigan law the views advanced by Justice Levin in his concurring 
opinion in Kropf. As the Michigan Supreme Court had reaffirmed 
only a year before West, 
[t]he clear rule in Michigan is that a majority of the court must agree 
on a ground for decision in order to make that [a] binding precedent 
for future cases. If there is merely a majority for a particular result, 
then the parties to the case are bound by the judgment but the case 
is not authority beyond the immediate parties.10 
In three zoning cases decided by the court shortly after West, how-
ever, Justices Levin, Fitzgerald, and T. G. Kavanagh constituted a 
majority of the five sitting justices. In these three cases, Sabo v. 
Township of Monroe,!0 Smookler v. Township of Wheatfield,21 and 
Nickola v. Township of Grand Blanc,22 Justice Levin (with Justices 
Fitzgerald and T. G. Kavanagh signing the opinion) treated the local 
rezoning decisions as "administrative acts" and applied the "reason-
ableness of the proposed use" test;23 he relied on the Kropf con-
curring opinion, even though the applicability of the new doctrines 
was not argued or briefed in the trial court, the court of appeals, 
or the supreme court. 24 In all three cases, the supreme court af-
firmed court of appeals' decisions that the uses proposed by land-
owners or developers should be allowed because "[t]he record in 
each [case] establishes that the proposed use (which happens to be 
a partially or totally excluded use) is reasonable."25 Although Jus-
tice Levin stated that "the proofs now adduced in circuit court 
[should] be presented administratively" and that judicial review 
should be restricted "to whether the record evidence supports the 
18. 392 Mich. at 467-68, 472, 221 N.W.2d at 307-08, 310. 
19. People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155,170,205 N.W.2d 461,467 (1973). 
20. 394 Mich. 531, 232 N.W.2d 584 (1975). 
21. 394 Mich. 574, 232 N.W.2d 616 (1975). 
22. 394 Mich. 589, 232 N.W.2d 604 (1975). 
23. E.g., Sabo v. Township of Monroe, 394 Mich. 531, 536-37, 232 N.W.2d 584, 
585-86 (1975). 
24. Justice Williams concurred separately in each case. Justice Coleman dis-
sented in Sabo and Smookler and dissented in part in Nickola. 
25. 394 Mich. at 537, 232 N.W.2d at 586. 
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administrative finding on the issue whether the proposed use is 
reasonable," he held that it was unnecessary to reverse and remand, 
because the record supported the supreme court's finding that the 
proposed use was "reasonable."26 
The three-justice majority opinions in Sabo, Smookler, and Nick-
ola are disturbing for a number of reasons. In the first place, the 
three "majority" justices never indicate why the rezoning decisions in 
those cases should be deemed "administrative" rather than "legisla-
tive." There is no indication that the record showed that the town-
ships of Monroe, Wheatfield, or Grand Blanc were subject to the "re-
zoning as administrative act" doctrine by virtue of their past zoning 
practices.27 More importantly, nothing in the opinions in these three 
cases suggests that the "majority" seriously considered the propriety 
of overruling the long line of Michigan cases28 holding-as the ma-
jority in Kropf had held-that a landowner's only recourse, upon fail-
ure to persuade the local governing body to rezone his land, was a 
constitutional challenge to the validity of the zoning regulations as 
applied to his land, with the zoning regulations presumed to be valid. 
Since there has been general agreement that the principle of stare 
decisis is an important element of Michigan jurisprudence, one 
would have expected some statement in Sabo, Smookler, or Nickola 
explaining why the long-settled rule was being overturned in favor 
of the new "rezoning as administrative act" doctrine and the "reason-
ableness of the proposed use" test of the validity of local govern-
ment decisions to grant or refuse rezoning. 29 The absence of any 
such statement is particularly disturbing because, even if the three-
justice "majority" in Sabo, Smookler, and Nickola strongly believed 
that the old rule was not working well and that a new rule should 
be adopted, one would have expected them to feel some hesitancy 
about changing the law when circumstances temporarily reduced 
the active membership of the court from seven to five. Such re-
luctance would have been especially appropriate in cases that were 
argued and briefed on the assumption that the old rule was· appli-
cable. 
26. 394 Mich. at 537, 232 N.W.2d at 586. 
27. See Cunningham, supra note I, at 1351. 
28. See note 10 supra. 
29. Justice Levin's concurring opinion in Kropf seems to be based on the theory 
that continued characterization of such decisions as "legislative" would violate the 
Michigan Constitution. See 391 Mich. at 165-69 nn.2-5, 215 N.W.2d at 190 nn.2-
5. But this idea is not developed in the Kropf concurring opinion, nor in West, Sabo, 
Smookler, or Nickola. 
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Vigorous opposition to the court's new direction was voiced by 
Justice Coleman. She rejected the "administrative act" doctrine on 
two general grounds: (1) the standard of "reasonableness of the 
proposed use" is not "workable"; and (2) the new doctrine usurps 
the zoning power properly delegated to local governing bodies, 
makes the court a "super zoning board," and imposes the court's 
social policies on local communities. ao 
As 1975 drew to a close, Michigan law governing the characteri-
zation of local governing body action on proposed rezoning amend-
ments was clearly unsettled. In Turkish v. City of Warren,81 division 
2 of the court of appeals accepted the "rezoning as administrative 
act" doctrine. In a number of subsequent cases, however, divisions 
2 and 3 of that court applied the Kropf majority rule in cases where 
the landowners had sought and been denied rezoning and had then 
sued to establish the unconstitutionality of the zoning regulations as 
applied to their lands. In at least two of these cases-Palmer v. 
Township of Superior82 and Ettinger v. Avon Township88-the court 
expressly held that the Kropf majority rule was still "the law" in 
Michigan and that the "plurality" opinions in Sabo, Smookler, and 
Nickola did not furnish any precedent to govern future decisions be-
cause less than a majority of the entire membership of the supreme 
court had concurred in those opinions. 
In Werkhoven v. City of Grandville,34 the court of appeals ini-
tially applied the Kropf majority rule without reference to the Levin 
concurring opinion and found against the landowner. However, with 
six justices sitting, the Michigan Supreme Court then issued a brief 
order remanding the Werkhoven case to the court of appeals "for 
reconsideration in light of the opinions of the Justices of this Court 
in Sabo ... Smookler ... and Nickola."35 On remand, the ap-
peals court said: 
While we are extremely tempted to hold that Kropf still controls 
since Sabo is not binding as precedent, we nevertheless believe that 
the Supreme Court's order left us with no other choice but to apply 
Sabo. . . . The Supreme Court's remand order is, in our view, ex-
press and unambiguous in directing us to apply Sabo rather then 
Kropf to the present case. It would be illogical to assume that the 
30. iSee, e.g., Sabo v. Monroe Township, 394 Mich. at 572, 232 ~.W.2d at 603-
04. 
31. 61 Mich. App. 435, 232 N.W.2d 732 (1975), 
32. 60 Mich. App. 664, 233 N.W.2d 14 (1975). 
33. 64 Mich. App. 529,236 N.W.2d 129 (1975). 
34. 61 Mich. App. 200,232 N.W.2d 356 (1975). 
35. 395 Mich. 753, 753, 232 N.W.2d 671, 671 (1975). 
April-May 1977) Rezoning as Administrative Act 989 
Supreme Court intended otherwise since our original opinion had al-
ready decided this case on the basis of Kropf.36 · 
The terms upon which the appeals court then remanded the case 
to the circuit court clearly show that it was making a good-faith at-
tempt to follow the supreme court's remand order, despite the court 
of appeals' belief that "by applying Sabo . . . we are ignoring 
binding Supreme Court precedent and, in effect, deciding this case 
on the basis of the wrong law."37 This statement was based, in part, 
on the appeals court's reading of In re Curzenski Estate.38 There 
the majority of the supreme court (four out of seven justices) re-
jected an earlier case as precedent because the then eight-member 
supreme court which had decided the case had split 4-3, with one 
member not sitting; the Curzenski court held that a majority of five 
in an eight-member court would be required for the establishment 
of a precedent. 
It was surely reasonable to interpret the supreme court's .remand 
order in Werkhoven to mean that Sabo and its companion cases had 
established the rule of decision in Michigan, pending reconsideration 
of the "rezoning as administrative act" doctrine by the full bench 
of the supreme court after its return to full strength with the addi-
tion of Justice Lindemer. This reading of Werkhoven was rein-
forced by the 6-1 decision of the supreme court in Negri v. Slotkin,39 
which held that the appeals court was bound by a 3-2 supreme court 
36. {>5 Mich. App. 741, 744, 238 N.W.2d 392, 394 (1975), leave to appeal denied, 
396 Mich. 850 (1976). 
37. 65 Mich. App. at 744 n.5, 238 N.W.2d at 394 n.5. In its opinion in 
Werkhoven on remand, the appeals court said: 
(1) We remand to the circuit court for the determination of whether the de-
fendant, in fact as well as in theory, exercises legislative rather than administra-
tive powers in respect to zoning. . . • In making this determination the court 
shall consider the following questions: (a) Has the legislative body of the 
defendant adopted, on general not individualized grounds, a plan of general appli-
cation to all the lands in the community? (b) Does the defendant's zoning 
authority reject all applications for change in zoning without reaching the 
merits? ( c) Does the defendant have a history of granting variances to indi-
vidual property owners only when constitutionally necessary? 
(2) If, after applying these standards, the circuit judge finds that the defend-
ant does, in fact, exercise legislative power in respect to zoning, then he shall 
return his findings to this Court where our previous decision will be affirmed. 
(3) If the circuit judge finds, however, that the zoning authorities of the 
defendant act administratively, then he shall remand to the City of Grandville 
for an administrative hearing on the question of whether the plaintifrs proposed 
use is reasonable under all the circumstances. At this hearing, the factors listed 
in Kropf • .• (concurring opinion) ... shall be considered along with all other 
pertinent factors. We will not retain jurisdiction should this situation arise. 
( 4) Judicial review of this hearing, if sought by any aggrieved party, . . . 
shall be restricted to the determination of whether the record evidence supports 
the administrative findings. • . . 
65 Mich. App. at 745-46, 238 N.W.2d at 394-95. 
38. 384 Mich. 334, 183 N.W.2d 220 (1971). 
39. 397 Mich. 105, 244 N.W.2d 98 (1976). 
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decision which invalidated the Michigan "guest passenger act" on 
constitutional grounds.40 The court of appeals had held in Negri that 
the 3-2 supreme court decision was "applicable as the law of that 
case only," and not binding on the appeals court under the principle 
of stare decisis.41 Speaking for the majority in Negri, Justice 
Williams said: 
Were we to hold that 3-2 or 3-1 decisions are not binding on the 
Court of Appeals and trial courts, the functioning of our judicial sys-
tem would be adversely affected. Urgent matters would be held in 
limbo until such time as a majority of four justices could be mustered. 
We [therefore] hold that a three-to-two decision of this court 
. . is binding on the Court of Appeals and the trial courts until over-
ruled by a later decision of this Court, including, if that be the case, 
a later three-to-two decision of this Court. 42 
The lone dissenter in Negri, Justice Coleman, argued that the 
majority's holding that 3-2 or 3-1 decisions are "binding on the Court 
of Appeals and trial courts" in fact gives such decisions precedential 
effect under the principle of stare decisis and that "[g]iving stare 
decisis effect to a decision signed by less than a majority of the whole 
Court defeats the purpose of the rule," which is "to bring about cer-
tainty, stability and predictability of the law."43 Justice Coleman was 
especially concerned by the prospect that the 3-2 decisions in Sabo 
and its companion cases, which had overturned well-settled prece-
dent, were being given stare decisis effect by Negri even though the 
full membership of the court had not reconsidered the issue raised 
in these cases. 44 
A court of appeals panel in !amens v. Avon Township40 con-
cluded that Negri made Sabo and the other 3-2 decisions binding 
precedents, "[e]ven though Sabo and its progeny would appear to 
eviscerate most zoning ordinances by requiring a showing of the 
mere reasonableness of the proposed use."46 We now know, how-
ever, that if the court of appeals had only delayed another three 
months in deciding ]amens, it would have learned that a majority 
of the entire membership of the supreme court disapproves of the 
40. Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636 
(1975). 
41. Negri v. Slotkin, 397 Mich. 105, 107, 244 N.W.2d 98, 98 (1976). 
42. 397 Mich. at 108, 244 N.W.2d at 99-100. 
43. 397 Mich. at 110, 244 N.W.2d at 100. 
44. 397 Mich. at 113-14, 244 N.W.2d at 101-02. 
45. 71 Mich. App. 70, 246 N.W.2d 410 (1976). 
46. 71 Mich. App. at 76, 246 N.W.2d at 413 (1976). 
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Sabo doctrine and prefers to apply the "old rule," which requires a 
landowner whose request for rezoning has been rejected to establish 
that the existing zoning regulations as applied to his land are so "ar-
bitrary and unreasonable" as to be unconstitutional. Speaking for a 
majority of four in Kirk v. Tyrone Township,47 Justice Williams ex-
plained the court's decision: 
Upon reflection, it does not seem wise as Sabo did to attempt to 
engraft upon the established legislative scheme of zoning and re-
zoning, a new system which admittedly requires new legislative action 
to operate optimally. Should the Legislature choose to revise the ap-
proach to zoning amendments in our state [by enacting "an adminis-
trative procedure act providing for review of local agency action in 
contested cases" for use if local authorities deny a change in zoning], 
this Court would, of course, view matters differently. But, as of the 
present time, it seems wisest to return to the philosophy expressed 
in Brae Burn, Inc. v. Bloomfield Hills ... and the Kropf majority. 
As we said in Brae Burn, and quoted again in Kropf, "The people 
of the community, through their appropriate legislative body, and not 
the courts, govern its growth and its life. "48 
In a concurring opinion in Kirk,49 Justice Levin argued that the 
majority had improperly raised the Sabo issue sua sponte, since the 
issue was not raised at the trial level, in the court of appeals, or in 
the briefs or oral argument in the supreme court. (The Kirk case 
had been fully briefed in the supreme court prior to the court's de-
cisions in Sabo and its companion cases.) This is a rather ironic 
argument since in Sabo and its companion cases the question of 
adopting Justice Levin's "rezoning as administrative act" doctrine and 
"reasonableness of the proposed use" test had not been raised before 
any court. Justice Fitzgerald, joined by Chief Justice T. G. 
Kavanagh, dissented50 on the ground that the majority's action in 
"overruling" Sabo and the other 3-2 decisions was "precipitous and 
ill-advised in light of the short passage of time since these cases were 
declared to be the view of this Court on zoning changes."51 How-
ever, Justice Fitzgerald did not discuss the propriety of three 
members of a seven-member court undertaking to overturn a well-
settled rule of law when the temporary absence of two members of 
47. 398 Mich. 429, 247 N.W.2d 848 (1976). 
48. 398 Mich. at 441, 247 N.W.2d at 853. 
49. 398 Mich. at 448, 247 N.W.2d at 855. 
50. 398 Mich. at 448, 247 N.W.2d at 856. Chief Justice Kavanagh concurred 
in both the Levin concurrence and the Fitzgerald dissent. 
51. 398 Mich. at 444, 247 N.W.2d at 857. In support of this view, Justice Fitz-
gerald quoted from Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant 
Co., 416 U.S. 600, 634-36 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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the court gave them an opportunity to do so, in cases where the "new 
rule" had never been briefed or argued. 
It would seem that the "rezoning as administrative act" doctrine 
is dead in Michigan, at least until it is embraced by the legislature 
or revived by at least four members of the supreme court. It is un-
fortunate that, on the basis of a doctrine now repudiated by a ma-
jority of the full bench of the supreme court, Monroe, Wheatfield, 
and Grand Blanc townships and perhaps the City of Grandviller.2 
have been forced by a temporary three-member majority of that court 
to permit real estate developments in violation of their zoning ordi-
nances. But the short, unhappy history of the "rezoning as adminis-
trative act" doctrine does, at least, provide an opportunity for reflec-
tion upon the proper criteria for application of the principle of stare 
decisis. 
Such reflection leads me to conclude that an existing, well-
established rule of law should not be overturned by less than a ma-
jority of the full bench of the supreme court. If for any reason the 
court is at less than full strength when it considers a case, it should 
follow the precedents unless a majority of the full bench of the court 
is prepared to vote to overrule; this should be the practice even if 
a majority of the justices sitting is strongly in favqr of overruling the 
precedents and changing the existing rule of law. As we have seen, 
if a temporary majority gives effect to its own views, it is likely that 
the new rule of law will be repudiated as soon as the court is again 
at full strength. Adherence to the proposed principle of self-restraint 
will not, of course, require that "urgent matters . . . be held in 
limbo until such time as a majority of four justices could be must-
ered," as suggested in Negri v. Slotkin.68 It will only require the 
court to follow precedents if sitting justices constituting a majority 
of the court's full membership cannot be persuaded to overrule the 
precedents. If a question of first impression is presented to the 
court when it is not at fuII strength, the court should, of course, de-
cide the question by majority vote of the sitting justices. 
Where the overruling decision arises out of a constitutional chal-
lenge to a statute, the proposed principle of self-restraint seems es-
pecially desirable in the light of Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. 
52. See Nickola v. Grand Blanc Township, 394 Mich. 589, 232 N.W.2d 604 
(1975); Smookler v. Wheatfield Township, 394 Mich. 514, 232 N.W.2d 616 
(1975); Sabo v. Monroe Township, 394 Mich. 531, 232 N.W.2d 584; Werkhoven 
v. City of Grandville, 65 Mich. App. 741, 238 N.W.2d 392 (1975). 
53. 397 Mich. at 108, 244 N.W.2d at 99. 
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McGowan54 and Negri v. Slotkin.55 In Manistee Bank, the Michigan 
Supreme Court overruled Naudzius v. Lahr56 and held the 1929 
Michigan "guest passenger act"57 partially unconstitutional by a 3-2 
vote. In Negri, the court by a 6-1 vote held that Manistee Bank was 
binding on the court of appeals unless and until it was overruled by 
the supreme court, but deliberately refused to deal with the consti-
tutional question on the merits. 58 The practical result of such an 
approach is that the constitutionality of the statute remains in doubt 
for an indefinite period, until the full bench of the supreme court 
has an opportunity to review it on the merits. This seems highly 
undesirable. Judicial deference to the legislative branch of the govern-
ment does not necessitate adoption of the statutory or constitutional 
requirement found in some states that an extraordinary majority of 
the full membership of the court must concur in a decison holding 
a statute unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the Michigan Supreme 
Court should adopt a rule of self-restraint requiring at least a bare 
majority of the full bench to concur in order to overrule a prior de-
cision upholding the constitutionality of a statute. 
54. 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975). 
55. 397 Mich. 105, 244 N.W.2d 98 (1976). 
56. 253 Mich. 210, 234 N.W. 581 (1931). In Manistee Bank, the circuit court 
rejected the constitutional challenge; the supreme court allowed an appeal prior to 
any decision by the court of appeals. 
57. The statute in question is MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 257.401 (1970). 
58. 397 Mich. at 106, 244 N.W.2d at 98. 
